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Abstract: An extensive literature in monetary theory has emphasized the role of money as a record-
keeping device. Money assumes this role in situations where using credit would be too costly, and some 
might argue that this role will diminish as the cost of information, and thus the cost of credit-based 
transactions, continues to fall. 
 
In this paper we investigate another use for money: the provision of privacy. That is, a money purchase 
does not identify the purchaser while a credit purchase does. In a simple trading economy with moral 
hazard, the efficiency of money is compared with that of credit, and we find that money may be useful 
even when information is free. 
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In this paper we investigate the role of money in providing transactions
privacy. Our interest in this topic stems in part from the ongoing devel-
opment of e-commerce, and in particular, consumer transactions on the
Internet. From the perspective of monetary theory, Internet-based or ￿vir-
tual￿transactions di⁄er fundamentally from ordinary transactions because
there is currently no widely accepted form of e-cash, or ￿virtual money.￿ 1
Without cash, purely anonymous transactions are not possible.
Is this lack of anonymity desirable? Some of the literature on money
versus credit (e.g., Townsend 1989, Taub 1994, Kocherlakota 1998, Kocher-
lakota and Wallace 1998, Aiyagari and Williamson 2000) suggests that the
value of money as a transactions medium stems largely from its role as a
proxy or ￿su¢ cient statistic￿for more complicated, credit-based systems of
individual accounts. The more costly and the more imperfect the available
credit-based system, the greater the need for money. With the develop-
ment of the Internet, however, the costs of maintaining and transmitting
vast amounts of information are falling dramatically. Some might therefore
argue that the low cost of Web-based information processing means that
there will be no role for e-money as a medium of exchange.
Our counter-argument is that in addition to its value as a possibly im-
perfect proxy for credit, the value of money also derives from its use in
anonymous exchanges, facilitating certain otherwise-infeasible transactions.
This property of money is most often associated with various types of shady
deals,2 but we will argue that it is of potential social value in economic sit-
uations where the parties in the transaction cannot trust each other not to
take subsequent opportunistic actions.3
In a simple trading economy with moral hazard,4 we compare the e¢ -
ciency of using as a transactions technology a non-anonymous record-keeping
1See Kuttner and McAndrews (2001) and Schreft (2002) for surveys of the various
technologies available for online payment.
2Camera (2001) explores the role of money as a facilitator of illicit activity. He, Huang,
and Wright (2003) note that currency is more subject to theft than bank money. In the
present paper we ignore these disadvantages associated with the anonymity of money, in
order to concentrate on its role in preventing identity theft.
3The increasing incidence of identity theft and related frauds suggests that this is more
than a theoretical possibility. A recent survey by the Federal Trade Commision (2003)
found that over 12 percent of Americans have been victims of identity theft within the
past ￿ve years. See Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (2000) for a treatment of privacy
issues in a law and economics context.
4In particular we consider an economy where theft may be prevalent. Theft is merely
an example of ex post opportunistic behavior that may arise under limited enforcement.
2device or anonymous money. We then consider the more realistic case
of anonymous money supplemented by a voluntary record-keeping device,
and in particular the e⁄ects of improvements in monitoring technologies (or
equivalently, privacy protection) on the demand for money.
In the case of Internet trading, for example, virtual money can increase
e¢ ciency of transactions. We also investigate an alternative arrangement
which may appear on the Internet, the use of intermediaries to provide
anonymity. We show that such an arrangement supplements non-anonymous
trade, but does not always act as a perfect substitute for anonymous money.
In cases where the legal structure cannot provide perfect enforcement, the
use of virtual money may dominate alternative arrangements.
2 The model
There are N ex ante identical, in￿nitely-lived agents, where N is large.5 All
agents are risk neutral, and have a common discount factor ￿. It will be con-
venient to think of agents as each having a unique ￿identity,￿corresponding
to a distinct ￿location,￿where the list of agents￿locations is public informa-
tion. A unique, indivisible, nonstorable consumption good can be produced
at each location. In every period, one agent randomly wakes up ￿hungry￿
for the consumption good of another agent, also randomly selected. Hungry
agents then journey to the location of their preferred supplier. The identity
of the hungry agent may or may not be revealed at this point, according to
the information structure of the economy and the transactions technology
available.6
When hungry, an agent desires exactly one unit of the particular sup-
plier￿ s good, which provides a utility of u. If not hungry, or if faced with a
di⁄erent supplier￿ s good, the agent receives no utility. It costs the supplier
s utils to make a unit of the good, where 0 < s < u.
After receiving the preferred supplier￿ s good, the hungry agent takes it
back to his dwelling in order to consume it. Once he has returned home,
the hungry agent may be ￿robbed￿ by another agent. For simplicity in
calculations, only one agent per period will be able to attempt a robbery,
where the would-be robber is randomly chosen. A robbery attempt costs
the robber c utils and will be successful only a fraction ￿ of the time. If
5For purposes of computing equilibria, it is convenient to have N ￿nite. Later on, we
will let N approach in￿nity in order to facilitate welfare comparisons.
6In the terminology of money search models, ￿single coincidences￿of wants are possible
under this setup, while ￿double coincidences￿are not.
3successful, the robbery carries a cost to the victim of f utils, so that the net
utility to the consumer after a robbery is u ￿ f, which may be positive or
negative. Successful theft imparts a bene￿t to the thief of "f utils, where
0 < " < 1. The timing of events within a period is displayed in Table 1.
Table 1: Events within a period
a. Consumer, supplier randomly chosen
b. Consumer journeys to supplier￿ s location
c. Trade occurs
d. Theft occurs with probability ￿
e. Consumer and possibly thief consume
In this environment, information on transactions carries both costs and
bene￿ts. No one automatically knows who is hungry on a particular day, so
if a would-be thief waits around another agent￿ s location, there will be only





which assures that no thief will attempt to steal from an individual at ran-
dom. However, a supplier always knows that he has provided someone a
good, and so if the consuming agent reveals his identity to his supplier, the
consumer makes it more likely he will be a victim. On the other hand, if the
consumer remains anonymous, the supplier may be unwilling to give him
the good, since there may be no way to obtain reciprocity in the future.
In the absence of theft, fully e¢ cient exchange would allow the hungry
agent in every period to purchase a good from his supplier. We let V ￿ be the
expected symmetric utility established by a fully informed social planner.
Since each agent has a 1=N chance of consuming or supplying each period,
and since theft is socially wasteful, an agent￿ s discounted expected utility





42.1 Information and exchange structures
We will compare outcomes in this model under a variety of information
structures. Initially we consider bilaterally observable gift exchanges. In
this arrangement, both suppliers and consumers keep track of a history of
exchanges with each other agent, but no one knows about trades made by an
agent with other agents. The history available in such arrangements, while
restricted, serves as both an incentive to exchange and an incentive to theft.
Next, we consider publicly observable gift exchanges￿ what Kocherlakota
(1998) refers to as ￿memory.￿ In these there is a perfect record of all trades
made by all participants. In the record, in every transaction, each agent￿ s
identity is revealed to all other agents.
We then consider the e⁄ect of introducing money. Money is an imperfect
record of the history of trades by an individual. But it is a record which
maintains the anonymity of consumers, and is therefore of value in sup-
plementing exchange. In particular, it allows the achievement of outcomes
which cannot be obtained without money.
We will also consider an environment of semi-anonymous gift exchange.
In this case the identity of the consuming agent is never revealed, limiting
the possibilities for both trade and theft. Nonetheless, trade can sometimes
be sustained under ￿social norms￿(Araujo (2004)).
Finally we will consider a semi-anonymous record-keeping technology,
and examine its advantages and disadvantages compared to money.
2.2 Bilateral information on goods exchanged
In this environment, each supplier in an exchange is informed of the identity
of the recipient. Each potential supplier must decide whether the disutil-
ity of production is worth the gain of ￿reciprocal privileges￿with a given
consumer. Absent theft, the supplier￿ s expected bene￿t from future (next





(u ￿ s) (3)
Exchange can be sustained as long as s; the cost of supplying a good, does
not exceed the quantity (3), the expected bene￿ts from reciprocal privileges.
In this case the expected discounted utility for each consumer (from trades
with all other agents) is simply given by V ￿.
For a given transaction, the only potential thief in this environment is
the supplier of the good. Were the supplier to steal the good, the buyer
5would infer that the seller was the thief, and could punish the seller by not
engaging in trade with the seller in any future meetings.
The instantaneous expected bene￿t to the supplier from theft is ￿"f ￿c.
If ￿"f < c, then theft will not be attempted and trade will proceed as in the
previous case. If ￿"f ￿ c, then theft may occur. An equilibrium without





(u ￿ s) ￿ maxfs;￿"f ￿ cg (4)
Exchange will still occur even with theft, however, if the expected net bene￿t
from continued future exchanges is large enough, i.e., if ￿"f ￿ c and
u ￿ s ￿ N￿1 (￿(1 ￿ ")f + c)
￿N(N ￿ 1)
￿ maxfs;￿f ￿ ug (5)
In other words, the expected net bene￿t from future exchanges must out-
weigh the expected disutility from production. It must also exceed the
disutility from acquiring a good and subsequently being robbed; otherwise
hungry agents will refuse to acquire goods. In this case the expected dis-
counted utility for each consumer is given by
u ￿ s ￿ N￿1 (￿(1 ￿ ")f + c)
￿N
(6)
Note that (6) includes both the expected bene￿t of being a thief and the
expected cost of being a victim of theft.
If neither (4) nor (5) holds, then autarky is the only equilibrium.
2.3 Full information on goods exchanged
We next consider an environment in which there is full information about
the identity of recipients of goods in any exchange that occurs. Consider the
incentives for theft. After each exchange, the designated thief knows where
his potential victim lives. The identity of a thief and the presence of stolen
goods are not observable. The instantaneous expected bene￿t to theft is
￿"f ￿ c, and theft will occur as long as this is nonnegative.7
Exchange occurs if agents are willing to supply goods to other agents
who have supplied goods in the past; a failure to supply results in the sup-
plier being relegated to autarky. Hence exchange will be sustained if the
7In this section we simply assume that a victim has no way of announcing that he
has been robbed, and makes no response to a theft. In a later section we consider an
environment in which a victim￿ s behavior changes as a result of the theft.
6cost of supplying a good does not exceed the expected future net bene￿t of




If on the other hand, ￿"f ￿ c; either autarky can result, or exchange
will occur subject to attempted theft after each exchange and a consequent
loss of value by recipients of goods. Exchange can still occur so long as
u ￿ s ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ")f ￿ c
￿N
￿ maxfs;￿f ￿ ug (8)
Comparing (8) with (5) we note that the RHS of each condition is the same
because defection has the same bene￿t under either arrangement. The LHS
is di⁄erent since an attempt at theft is certain under full information, but
penalties for defection are enforced by more agents. Under full information
agents￿expected discounted utility is
u ￿ s ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ")f ￿ c
￿N
(9)
3 The e⁄ects of introducing money
We now consider the e⁄ects of introducing ￿at money into the environ-
ments described above. Here, the construct analyzed in Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989) comprises a unit of money: an indivisible, inherently valueless, non-
counterfeitable object, where each agent can hold a maximum of one such
object. There is a ￿xed supply of money and not all agents possess money
at any given time. Money confers anonymity￿ a consumer making a pur-
chase with money does not reveal his identity to his supplier, or to others.
The quantity of money circulating in the economy is known to all agents,
however.
3.1 Money under semi-anonymity
Suppose that would-be consumers cannot (or prefer not to) reveal their
identity to would-be suppliers. Trade in this case is ￿semi-anonymous,￿
since the supplier￿ s identity is always known. Money o⁄ers opportunities
for exchange in this environment. Let M be the fraction of agents in the
economy with money, and let V (n) be the value function of an agent n units
7of money, where n 2 f0;1g. Absent theft, the ￿ ow Bellman equations for








(u(1 + ￿) + V (0) ￿ V (1)) (11)
























If exchange occurs, it remains anonymous; hence the instantaneous expected
return to theft is (￿"f)=(N ￿ 1)￿c, which is assumed to be negative. The
existence of monetary equilibrium requires that obtaining money is a su¢ -
cient incentive to supply a good, i.e., that
V (1) ￿ V (0) ￿ (1 + ￿)s (14)
which is equivalent to
(1 ￿ M)u ￿ s(1 ￿ M + ￿N) (15)
As is common in search models of money, a monetary equilibrium obtains
if agents are patient enough (for su¢ ciently small ￿ > 0).
In monetary equilibrium, an agent￿ s expected utility is given by
M(1 ￿ M)(u ￿ s)
￿N
(16)
and the welfare-maximizing quantity of money is given by M = 1=2. Ex-
pected utility is less than V ￿ because trade can only occur if money holdings
are exactly right.
8For computational simplicity these and other Bellman equations involving money are
written as if the fraction of agents holding money does not depend on whether the agent
himself holds money. This approximation holds precisely as N ! 1.
83.2 Money as an alternative to bilateral information
Now we consider allowing consuming agents to choose between transactions
technologies. In this section we allow them the following two choices: they
may anonymously purchase goods with money, or they may choose to reveal
their identity to their suppliers (and no one else) with the intent of obtaining
￿credit￿for future reciprocal actions. Agents purchasing on credit are ex-
pected to make repayment by supplying goods to counterparties with whom
they have previously engaged in credit transactions, who choose to purchase
on credit and not with cash. Agents failing to make these required pay-
ments lose their credit with that counterparty and subsequent transactions
between the two are limited to cash. As was the case in the previous section,
a credit purchase exposes the purchaser to the possibility of theft from the
supplier.
Depending on the model parameters, money, credit, or both may be
used in equilibrium. Credit alone will be used, for example, if there is no
theft and if agents are patient enough. Money will used exclusively if the
likelihood and cost of theft is high enough. We can also show that there are
equilibria where both money and credit exist.
For there to be an equilibrium with both money and credit, it must be
the case that theft sometimes occurs in credit transactions, so that holders of
money will always prefer to transact with money when they wish to consume.
This will only be possible when their potential supplier does not have money;
otherwise the transaction will proceed on a credit basis. Likewise, it must
be the case that potential suppliers without money must prefer transacting
with money, when it is available, to transacting with credit.
Taking the above considerations into account, we can write the Bellman















































































where V (n) is the value functions for agents with n units of money, when
agents have a choice between the use of money and ￿bilateral credit.￿Equa-
tion (17) says that the value function of an agent without money equals the
9weighted sum of the continuation values of being a consumer in a credit
transaction, a supplier in a cash transaction, a supplier in a credit transac-
tion, and not transacting at all. Equation (18) says that the value function
of an agent with money equals the weighted sum of the continuation value of
being a consumer in a cash transaction, a consumer in a credit transaction,
a supplier in a credit transaction, and not transacting. Equations (17) and




















(V (1) ￿ V (0)) (20)








[(M(1 ￿ M) ￿ (1 + N￿))￿f (21)
￿
￿












M(1 + N￿) + (1 ￿ M)2￿
￿f (22)
￿((1 + N￿) ￿ (1 ￿ M)M)(￿"f ￿ c)]g
To sustain this behavior as an equilibrium, it must be the case that
agents are willing to ￿repay debts,￿i.e., agents must have an incentive to
supply a consumption good in credit transactions. The agent￿ s alternative
would be to carry out future transactions with that counterparty solely in




















u ￿ s ￿ N￿1 (￿(1 ￿ ")f + c) ￿ 0 (24)
10as ￿ tends to zero. Condition (24) will be satis￿ed if ￿(1￿")f +c is not too
large, i.e., if the problem with theft is not too severe. Agents with money








which is equivalent to
(￿N)￿f ￿ M (￿(" ￿ 1)f ￿ c) (26)
which is satis￿ed as long theft is socially costly (￿"f < ￿f + c). Finally it











(￿f (1 ￿ M) + (￿"f ￿ c)M) ￿ ￿"f ￿ c (28)
which holds M > 0 for ￿ > 0 su¢ ciently small. Two points should be
noted. First, once cash exists the requirements for maintaining willingness
to repay debts are stricter than they otherwise would be: the threat is
not to revert to autarky but to revert to monetary transactions. Thus,
the existence of money to a certain extent drives out debt.9 Second, it is
the nonobservability of an individuals money holdings which necessitates
imposing two of the constraints in the money-credit equilibrium (conditions
(25) and (27)). Note in particular if sellers could not hide their money
holdings then (27) could be relaxed.
3.3 Money as an alternative to full information
As in the previous section, consumers have a choice between using money
or revealing their identity in credit transactions. In the latter case their
identity is revealed not only to their counterparty but all other agents in the
economy.
As under bilateral information, equilibria exist with only money or only
credit transactions. Su¢ ciently patient agents will prefer to transact with
credit as long as there is no theft. If theft is su¢ ciently likely and costly,
9For other examples of interactions between di⁄erent forms of payments media see He,
Huang, and Wright (2003).
11agents will only want to use money. There are also equilibria where both
money and credit are used. In such an equilibrium holders of money always
transact in money if this is possible. In the money-credit equilibrium, the


















V (1) ￿ V (0)
￿
(30)
where V denotes the value function of agents who have a choice between





















To sustain this equilibrium, it must be the case that agents are willing to
￿repay debts,￿i.e., agents must have an incentive to supply a consumption
good in credit transactions. The agent￿ s alternative would be to carry out








which is equivalent to
[￿N + 1 ￿ M(1 ￿ M)](u ￿ ￿f) ￿ [1 ￿ M(1 ￿ M)]s (34)
which is satis￿ed, for example, if M is su¢ ciently small, or the likelihood of
theft ￿ is su¢ ciently low. This equilibrium also requires that agents with








which is equivalent to
￿N + M ￿ 0 (36)
which is automatically satis￿ed for ￿N;M > 0. Suppliers prefer receiving















which holds for ￿ > 0 su¢ ciently small.
4 Some welfare comparisons
We can use the analysis above to make welfare comparisons among di⁄erent
economies, using expected aggregate instantaneous steady-state utility as a
criterion, where the expectation is taken over the success or failure of theft.
We begin by comparing an economy where semi-anonymous transactions
take place only with money (the economy of section 3.1), to an economy
where bilateral information is available on all transactions (section 2.2), and
one where full information is available on all transactions and ￿multilateral
credit￿arises (section 2.3). In the absence of theft (when ￿"f < c), such a
comparison is quite simple and is displayed in Table 2.
Table 2: money versus credit without theft
Money Credit
Bilateral Multilateral P
U M(1 ￿ M)(u ￿ s) u ￿ s u ￿ s
Feas.
(u ￿ s)(1 ￿ M) ￿
s￿N
u ￿ s ￿
s￿N(N ￿ 1)
u ￿ s ￿
s￿N
From Table 2 it is clear that credit dominates money where both are
feasible. Bilateral credit is the most delicate arrangement and depends on
there being a relatively small number of agents in the economy. As we
drive N to in￿nity while allowing the interval between time periods and ￿
to shrink as 1=N, we obtain the limiting results (where r > 0 is the limit of
￿N) displayed in Table 3.10




U M(1 ￿ M)(u ￿ s) u ￿ s
Feasibility (u ￿ s)(1 ￿ M) ￿ sr u ￿ sr
10Technically this last step is necessary to make the environment of Section 2.4 com-
patible with Kocherlakota￿ s (1998) concept of ￿memory.￿Essentially this requires that all
matches be between agents without any previous contact.
13Bilateral credit becomes infeasible in this case as the chance of a repeated
match goes to zero. Multilateral credit remains feasible, however, and absent
theft we have the standard results of the money literature that credit is
feasible whenever money is, and delivers higher welfare.
When theft can occur, these comparisons are less straightforward. Table
4 o⁄ers steady-state comparisons of economies under the threat of theft (for
which ￿"f ￿ c) with only money (section 3.1), bilateral credit (section 2.2),
or multilateral credit (section 2.3).
Table 4: E (
P
U) with theft for various environments
Money Only Bilateral Credit Money and Credit
M(1 ￿ M)(u ￿ s)
u ￿ s
￿N￿1 (￿(1 ￿ ")f + c)
u ￿ s￿
￿(1 ￿ ")f ￿ c
Feasibility for monetary equilibrium is the same as before, i.e., condi-
tion (15); feasibility for bilateral credit is given by (5), and feasibility for
multilateral credit is given by (8). From the table it is clear that under the
threat of theft, money can dominate credit. Bilateral credit, where feasible,
dominates multilateral credit, as it a⁄ords fewer opportunities for socially
costly theft. Bilateral credit may dominate money if problems with theft
are not too severe.
Finally, Table 5 o⁄ers a welfare comparison of the economies with money
only, multilateral credit only, and a combination of multilateral credit and
money (section 3.3).
Table 5: E (
P
U) with theft for various environments
Money Only Multilateral Credit Only Money and Credit
M(1 ￿ M)(u ￿ s)
u ￿ s
￿￿(1 ￿ ")f ￿ c
u ￿ s￿
(1 ￿ M(1 ￿ M))
￿(￿(1 ￿ ")f + c)
For the equilibrium with both money and credit, feasibility is given by
condition (34) in addition to (15). A combination of both money and credit
necessarily dominates credit by itself, and will dominate money as long as
feasibility condition (34) is met, and the surplus created in trade exceeds
the social cost of theft, i.e., as long as u￿s > ￿(1￿")f +c. If the cost and
likelihood of theft are too high, then only exchange with money is possible.
In short, in an economy without theft and with a frictionless system of
credit, money would be super￿ uous. When theft is present, it would be
welfare-improving to introduce money into a world with frictionless credit,
14as money introduces the possibility of anonymous, theft-free transactions.
Not all potential consumers will have access to money, however, meaning
that money does not completely supplant credit.
5 Robustness
Money is not the only mechanism for sustaining exchange without theft. In
this section, we consider two other possible￿social norms￿ : gift-giving, and
retaliation by the victims of theft.
5.1 Gift-giving
To analyze gift-giving, consider a version of this environment under semi-
anonymity. Each potential supplier￿ s identity is known to the consuming
agent, but the identity of the potential consumer is unknown to the supplier.
Then, following Araujo (2004), we can show that exchange can sometimes
be sustained under a ￿social norm,￿whereby each potential supplier agrees
to supply a good to an unknown consumer, in anticipation of reciprocity
when the supplier wishes to consume.
For gift-giving to be a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that the
anticipated net future bene￿t of adhering to the social norm of gift-giving
exceeds the anticipated future bene￿ts of defecting from the social norm.
Defection is contagious in the sense that as a defector refuses to supply his
good, this results in additional defections. To rule out defections it must be
true that
￿s + V ￿ ￿ Vd (39)







￿t N ￿ E (Dt)
N (N ￿ 1)
(40)
where Dt is the number of defectors as of time t and E denotes expectation
as of period 0. Given that there are i defectors at time t, then


















if j = i
0 if j 6= i;i + 1
15Let the N-dimensional vector ￿t, represent the probability distribution of






































1 = (0;1;0;:::;0) (42)
since there are two defectors in period 1￿ the initial defector and his victim
at time 0. De￿ne ￿ as the N-dimensional row vector whose ith element is





























￿((1 + ￿)I ￿ A)
￿1 ￿1
where I is the N-dimensional identity matrix.11
Then, as agents become more patient and ￿ goes to zero, it is evident
from (43) that the value of defecting tends to a ￿nite limit, whereas the
value of adhering to the gift-giving norm (the LHS of (39)) grows without
bound. Hence, exchange can be sustained under gift-giving for su¢ ciently
patient agents.
Gift-giving becomes increasingly fragile as the number of agents grows,







N (N ￿ 1)￿2 +
(1 + ￿)
￿N+2
N (N ￿ 1)￿2
!
(44)
11These calculations closely follow those of Araujo (2004, 246). Following Ellison (1994)
and Kandori (1992), Araujo also examines social norms sustained by sequential equilib-
ria. In this paper we con￿ne our attention to Nash equilibrium; extensions to sequential
equilibrium in the context of money and theft would be an interesting, though involved,
extension.
16This inequality can be understood as follows: since there is one meeting per
period, the number of defections can increase at most by one per period.
The worst case scenario is
Dt = minft + 1;Ng (45)
Actual contagion must proceed more slowly than this worst-case scenario.
Let







N ￿ t ￿ 1
N (N ￿ 1)
￿
(46)
V d gives the value of defecting if a further defection would occur every period
following the initial defection, until the entire population were exhausted;
simplifying (46) we obtain the RHS of (44). Driving N to in￿nity and taking






r ￿ 1 + e￿r￿
(47)
where r is the limit of ￿N. Comparing V 1
d to the analogous limiting expres-
sion for V ￿, we obtain a su¢ cient condition for gift-giving to be infeasible
V 1
d > ￿s + V ￿1 (48)
or equivalently,
r(1 + r)




From (49) it is clear that gift-giving is not feasible for N and r su¢ ciently
large. Comparing (15) and (49) it is also clear that for large N, there will
be a range of values of r for which monetary exchange is feasible while
gift-giving is not.
5.2 Retaliation by victims
In describing the public information regime of section 2.3, we assumed that
victims of theft had no way to retaliate. In fact, retaliation could take many
forms. In the opposite extreme, suppose that a victim of theft could make
a public announcement that a theft had occurred. In an equilibrium with
trade and without theft, such an announcement would signal a ￿defection￿
from the social norm of no theft, leading all agents to revert to autarky in
subsequent periods. An equilibrium without theft is sustainable as long as
17the expected net bene￿ts to future exchange exceed both the disutility of
supplying and the private return to theft:
u ￿ s
￿N
￿ maxfs;￿"f ￿ cg (50)
The ability to make such announcements is welfare-improving in that it
reduces opportunities for theft. Condition (50) is also less stringent that
condition (4), meaning that if such announcements are possible, theft-free
trade is easier to achieve in an environment of full information than under bi-
lateral information. If condition (50) is violated, however, trade with money
may still dominate trade with credit. Note also that public announcements
are the most forceful form of retaliation, and other forms of retaliation would
be expected to have more limited e⁄ects. In addition, (49) may hold and
(50) may fail simultaneously, while money is still feasible. In other words,
there are parameter values where money succeeds while both memory and
gift-giving fail.
6 Intermediation
Intermediaries can also be in the business of providing privacy. One pos-
sibility is ￿inside money￿ ￿ a reputable agent issues a limited number of
non-counterfeitable notes which circulate.12 However there are also ways
an intermediary can provide privacy with a setup which does not resem-
ble money. On the Internet, for example, there are sites which serve as
￿anonymizers.￿ These serve as gateways to other sites, scrambling the Web
surfer￿ s information so his identity cannot be traced.
In this section we consider both an anonymizing institution which takes
the form of intermediated credit, and an institution providing inside money.
6.1 Intermediated credit
We start with the economy of section 2.3 in which transactions are public
information. In addition, we assume that ￿"f > c so that theft will occur
(in the absence of retaliation by victims).
Let us now suppose that a bank charter is given to one agent. All other
agents have the option of opening an ￿account￿ with the banker. When
agents with a bank account wish to consume, they go to the banker and
12For example, Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) or Kiyotaki and Moore (2000) present
models of inside money based on this idea.
18give him the location of their desired supplier. If the supplier has a bank
account, the banker goes to the supplier, purchases the good with bank
credit, and immediately and privately passes on the good to the consuming
agent. Would-be thieves (other than the banker) are stymied because they
do not know the location of the agent with the good. The banker is, in
e⁄ect, ￿anonymizing￿agents￿transactions.
This arrangement is sustainable as an equilibrium as long as (1) all agents
have a bank account, (2) all agents believe that if they ￿defect￿from this
arrangement, all other agents will likewise defect, and the economy will
return to autarky, and (3) there can be public announcements of defections
by the counterparty of the defector.
Note there are two opportunities for defection, the ￿rst being that a
potential supplier can refuse to provide a good to the banker, and the second
being that the banker, who knows the identities of consuming agents, can
rob them after delivering their consumption good. The supplier will supply
his good to the banker as long as the expected net bene￿t of (theft-free)
future transactions exceeds the disutility of supplying the good, i.e., as long
as (7) holds. The banker will refrain from robbing his ￿depositors￿only if
the expected net bene￿t of being theft-free in future transactions exceeds
the short-term gain from theft, i.e., if
u ￿ s
￿N
￿ ￿"f ￿ c (51)
which is satis￿ed for ￿N > 0 su¢ ciently small. Thus, this arrangement
is sustainable if the banker is patient enough. Note also that the com-
bination of the two conditions (7) and (51) is simply the condition (50).
In other words, the intermediated credit arrangement succeeds precisely in
cases where public announcements of theft are e⁄ective.
Thus, a ￿banking￿type of arrangement can in some cases deliver a ￿rst-
best outcome (credit transactions without theft).13 Intermediation is supe-
rior to both unintermediated trade under full information (without retali-
ation) because it reduces the scope for theft, and to trade under bilateral
information because it does not require such a high degree of patience on
the part of suppliers. On the other hand, if agents are too impatient, or if
13Given the level of abstraction of our model, we can regard this arrangement as an
idealization of a money order or of a cashier￿ s check￿ in each case the transaction can be
kept anonymous from the seller but not from the bank. While it may seem farfetched for
the purchaser to worry about needing privacy to protect him from his own banker, exactly
the analogous problem arises on the Internet, as purchasers worry about the security of
databases that underlie their online payments arrangements.
19the temptation to steal is too great, money or a combination of money and
unintermediated credit will be feasible, while intermediated credit will not.
6.2 Private banknotes
Suppose that the information structure only allows for semi-anonymous
gift exchange. One agent is allowed to issue private bearer notes. Tech-
nologically, the notes are the same as ￿at money described above: non-
counterfeitable, discrete, and subject to the restriction that each individual
may hold at most one note. In addition, there is no requirement that notes
be redeemed. Thus, notes circulate inde￿nitely and their use in a purchase
preserves the anonymity of the purchaser. The quantity of notes outstanding
is known by all agents.
In the long run, the same set of monetary equilibria would obtain under
private money as under ￿at money. While private money would o⁄er an
improvement over autarky, a private issuer would have an incentive to issue
as many notes as possible, i.e., until the incentive constraint (15) binds. If
(15) binds for a per-capita money stock M > 1=2, then the use of private
money would result in an oversupply of notes.
Likewise, we could introduce private money into an economy in which all
transactions are public information. Then the private money issuer would
issue notes until either (15) or (34) were binding. From the discussion above,
this would necessarily lead to an improvement over either autarky or credit-
only transactions. If the money issuer chooses a per-capita money stock
M > 1=2, it would again lead to an oversupply of banknotes.14
In terms of privacy, the important distinction between circulating media
and accounts is that as the money passes from hand to hand, even the initial
issuer no longer knows who currently holds it.
7 Conclusion
Somewhat paradoxically, recent advances in monetary theory have shed
doubt on the value of money in technologically sophisticated economies.
14We have glossed over the technically interesting but (for our purposes) inessential issue
of how such an equilibrium starts up. The banker enjoys seignorage in initial periods by
issuing money for purchases. In those initial periods, the banker also bears an additional
cost as being the most likely victim: potential thieves in period 1 will regard the banker￿ s
location as being the one most likely to contain goods. Given the long run bene￿ts it
may still be worthwhile for the banker to issue notes; if not he may choose a randomizing
strategy in which he sometimes gives out money in early periods without obtaining goods.
20Money has been portrayed as at best, an imperfect proxy for memory
(Kocherlakota 1998 and related papers), or at worst, an enabler of illicit,
welfare-reducing activities (Camera 2001). In this paper, we have argued
that the ￿demotion￿ of money to a poor cousin of credit-based arrange-
ments may have been premature. In an economy with less-than-perfect
enforcement, we have shown that the value of money may derive from its
supposed imperfection, from the anonymity that it confers.
This is not to argue that arrangements other than money cannot also
provide purchasers with anonymity. Above we have considered several such
arrangements, including private intermediation and reciprocal gift-giving.
Yet we have also shown that there are some circumstances where trade with
money is feasible while trade under these alternative arrangements is not.
This suggests to us that the classic solution to the problem of transactions
privacy￿ money￿ will persist well into the foreseeable future.
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